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Central America continues facing high poverty and indigence levels, while being the most unequal region in 
the world. This paper therefore proposes the eradication of extreme poverty in the region through the 
implementation of a universal, unconditional cash transfer to all citizens. Such a regional Basic Income 
would guarantee every citizen, independently of occupation, age, or family background, survival. 
Simultaneously, the proposal would further income redistribution, enhance education, future productivity 
and growth, promote macroeconomic stability, and alleviate emigrational pressures. Such a scheme would 
establish a paradigm change in development policy thinking by moving away from the uncertainty of 
palliative, short-term oriented programs featuring conditionality and means-testing, towards a rights-based, 
preventive approach of poverty eradication. Central America invites for such a proposal, considering its 
countries’ blatant inequality and poverty levels, on the one hand, while on the other its existing common 
market and relative degree of integration could facilitate such undertaking. The paper estimates the costs of 
covering the entire region’s population with a Basic Income, and shows that such a proposal would be 
feasible, and economically affordable and beneficial, while offering a novel and universally just stance on 
poverty eradication. 
RESUMEN  
Centroamérica sigue enfrentando niveles muy altos de pobreza e indigencia, siendo además la región más 
desigual del mundo. Por lo tanto, este ensayo propone la erradicación de la pobreza extrema en la región a 
través de la implementación de una transferencia monetaria universal e incondicional. Esta Renta Básica 
garantizaría la sobrevivencia a todo ciudadano, independientemente de su condición personal, familiar, u 
ocupacional. Simultáneamente, la propuesta fomentaría la redistribución de ingresos, avanzaría la 
educación, productividad futura y crecimiento, promovería la estabilidad macroeconómica, y aliviaría la 
presión migratoria. El esquema establecería un cambio en las políticas de desarrollo, substituyendo los 
programas condicionados paliativos y orientados al corto plazo con un acercamiento a la erradicación de la 
pobreza preventivo y basado en derecho. Centroamérica invita para tal propuesta, considerando la ostensible 
desigualdad y los niveles de pobreza de sus países por un lado, y por el otro la existencia de un mercado 
común y grado relativo de integración, que podría facilitar la tarea. El ensayo estima los costos de cubrir la 
población entera de la región con una Renta Básica, y demuestra que dicha propuesta puede ser viable, y 
económicamente accesible y benéfica, mientras ofrezca una postura novedosa y universalmente justa hacia 






Extreme poverty is much more than insufficient income. It means hunger, deprivation of proper health and 
education, diseases and chronic malnutrition, not being able to make life plans, fear for the future and 
minimal job options, diminished life expectancy, powerlessness, lack of representation and access to public 
services, marginalization and social exclusion, experience of violence, and loss of liberty to design one’s 
own life1. In today’s world of splendor, it is outrageous that still one in every four people lives under 
conditions of extreme poverty (World Bank, 2010). Despite years of attempts of extreme poverty 
eradication and temporary improvements in the first years of the new Millennium, trends are volatile, and 
from 2008 onwards, indigence levels actually started to rise again in Central America, the most unequal 
region of the world (ECLAC, 2009). Concerned by this distressing development, this paper proposes the 
eradication of extreme poverty in this region through a new and straightforward means: the implementation 
of a universal Basic Income (BI) grant, guaranteeing every citizen, whatever his/her occupation, age, or 
background, survival. The proposal simultaneously furthers income redistribution, enhances education, 
future productivity and growth, alleviates emigrational pressures, and promotes macroeconomic stability, by 
paying each citizen of the Central American region the local equivalent of 1.25 $ per day, the international 
extreme poverty line2. By this means, extreme poverty in the most unequal region of the world is effectively 
eradicated. Such a wide-reaching proposal must surely be both infeasible and unaffordable? As a matter of 
fact, it is neither: most features necessary for the implementation are in place, and costs are relatively 
moderate considering the momentum expected from the scheme. In spite of the novelty of this particular 
proposal to the region, there is ample room for optimism that a paradigm change towards this new concept 
will improve a wide array of poverty-related issues. In the remainder, this paper will demonstrate the 
foundation for such realistic optimism. 
To this end, the paper is divided conceptually into two main parts, of which the first deals with 
the theoretical and analytical notion of a Basic Income as such. Firstly, it illuminates the choice of region, 
justified by the relentless current circumstances of poverty and inequality in the region. Subsequently, the 
concept of a BI will be introduced and defined, as well as briefly contrasted with other development 
approaches like in-kind aid, and somewhat more thoroughly compared to conditional cash transfers 
(CCT), the predominant measure in the region. Thereafter, the estimated impacts the implementation of a 
BI in the region might have will be outlined. Lastly, indicators to measure progress of the scheme and its 
impacts will be suggested. The second half of the paper deals with the specificities of the particular 
proposal for the region, which will firstly be sketched out, specifying its individual phases and costs. In 
continuation, the possible sources of financing such a scheme will be investigated, followed by a brief 
look upon institutional responsibilities issues to be resolved. Finally, the conclusion will present a brief 
future outlook of the Regional Basic Income for Central America. 
                                                     
1 This list describes but some of the wide-reaching effects the different dimensions of poverty in terms of depth, breadth and 
duration exert on all areas of human existence, far beyond “just” income, consumption and resource deprivation (Clark& 
Hulme 2010). Deliberately, this proposal to some degree omits deeper analysis in areas of impact in political, social, 
personal, philosophic and other realms of being, concentrating chiefly on (socio-) economic and financial implications. 
2 Stipulates the revised 1$/day extreme poverty line. In spite of the World Bank using 2005 Purchasing Power Parity terms, 
this paper uses current exchange rates considering significant political-economy changes influencing livelihood of the 




I. NEED AND URGENCY TO ACT IN THE REGION OF CENTRAL AMERICA 
Two main factors indicate the rationale for this proposal, contemplating the “why here” and the “why now”: 
for one, the region of Central America hosts some of the most unequal countries in the world with an 
unambiguous need for progressive action. On the other hand, current development programs are not 
efficient enough to alleviate substantially existing circumstances of poverty and meet agreed targets such as 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), constituting an urgency to exploit other options. 
Economic change enticed by technological revolution enables humanity to reach unknown levels 
of wealth with ever less physical work. The flip-side of these extraordinary technological, labor saving 
achievements, however, is that they lower workers’ bargaining power over wages for fear of redundancy. 
Consequently, ever fewer jobs paid ever less money, for an increasing number of people, leaves them 
with less disposable income. Nationwide, this lowers private consumption capacity, ultimately stagnating 
economic growth. In a situation of skyrocketing under-/unemployment, this leads to increasing levels of 
poverty and misery (Huerta, 2009). Such a vicious circle holds true for the entire, interconnected world, 
but disproportionately affects those regions already hampered by high incidents of poverty and inequality. 
Central America boasts to be a “Region of peace, development, liberty and democracy” 
(www.sica.int), while really over half its population of roughly 41 million people suffers from poverty 
and extreme poverty; it is the most unequal region of the world in terms of income distribution and social 
equity, and experiences extreme levels of violence (Cantón, 2010), facing an unambiguous need for 
progressive action3. 
The persistence of poverty and aggravation of inequality in the region have profound implications 
for development: existing forms of aid and conceptual paradigms have shown “limited effectiveness, 
especially in contexts of systemic shocks, where there are mass entitlement failures in which whole 
communities are blighted by economic setback, an ecological disaster or an epidemic” (Standing, 2008, p.2). 
Neither do the programs seem to propel “trickle down” to the poor and economically insecure. Economic 
insecurity, however, is extremely high in a context of informal labor markets reaching over half the 
population (ECLAC, 2010a)4, and where losing ones jobs means losing ones livelihood. Concomitantly, 
fostered by globalization and climate change, external shocks have become more numerous and the risks 
communities and individuals are exposed to, are intensifying in scope and breadth (Standing, 2008). 
Suffice it to mention that 42.4 % of Nicaraguan children live under extreme poverty conditions, and half 
the children under 5 years old in Guatemala suffer from chronic malnutrition (ECLAC/UNICEF, 2010). 
In this setting, the Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana (Central American Integration 
System, SICA) inter alia, aims to “achieve a system of regional welfare and economic and social justice” 
for all citizens of the area, eradicate extreme poverty, and endorse sustainable development (according to 
its Mission Statement). In other words, it wants to promote a “sustainable social, economic and political 
                                                     
3 The region, geographically, comprises seven countries, while economic and political integration is mainly encompassing the 
five “traditionally” Central American countries of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, which will 
also be the focus of this proposal. This focus is justified e.g. by Guerra-Borges (2009), p. 108 ff: “El articulo 1 del Protocolo 
dice a la letra que ‘Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua y Panamá son una comunidad económica y 
política, que aspira a la integración de Centroamérica.’”, continuing on p.112: “…no obstante que ninguno de los presidentes 
de Panamá libremente electos ha considerado que su país es miembro de la comunidad centroamericana”. It is, however, by 
no means meant to be exclusionary, and should be viewed rather as a starting point to be extended to other countries 
eventually. 
4 Informal sector in the region comprises 50% of the male and 64% of the female labor force, the latter in Guatemala reaching 




development for the member states and the region as a whole” (ibid). This regional commitment is an 
important asset for a potential region-encompassing scheme, and coincides with the ECLAC (2010b) 
report, “La Hora de la Igualdad” (Time for Equality), declaring that the central value in a development 
context for the region of Latin America is Equality. Accordingly, this equality is to be understood as a 
“regional commitment” and birth right for all Latin American citizens, in line with the right to food and 
health, as opposed to being a function of income. This change of direction indicates the crucial importance 
of responsible, quality politics, and points towards the need for institutionalized protection for the population, a 
“universal social security” based on long-term oriented public policy (ibid). In the same vein, Howard (2007) 
cautions that political culture grounded in little commitment to equality, strong lobbyism restraining movement 
into a more egalitarian direction, and “the role of money in the electoral process” might be “a greater obstacle 
to serious consideration of a regional minimum income than the structural differences”. Since existing 
institutions reinforce political culture, change towards a more egalitarian society must be accompanied by a 
reform of those institutions (ibid). A regional BI for Central America would address those needs while 
effectively placing equality at the center of (healthy) regional development. 
The commitment to the Millennium Development Goals in 2000 represents “the most important 
promise ever made to the world’s most vulnerable people” (UN MDG Report, 2010). Today, ten years 
later, this promise is far from being fulfilled. Even though some important progress has been made, the 
critical question remains the transformation of the pace of change throughout the last decade, into 
dramatically faster progress (ibid). Disturbingly, in its 2010 progress report, the UN asserts that for Latin 
America and the Caribbean in relation to the first and most basic goal, eradication of absolute poverty and 
hunger, “progress is insufficient to reach the goal if current tendencies persist” (UN MDG Report, 2010), 
while ECLAC (2010c, p.23) estimates chances as “more remote” now then two years ago.  
Not only are the targets not met, which could be considered problematic on a symbolic sphere 
“only”, but the situation for the most disadvantaged in society is actually exacerbated: while incomes of 
poor households diminished due to higher unemployment following the economic downturn, prices of 
staple foods remained high in 2009 (UN MDG Report, 2010). This development contributes to a 
considerable reduction in the effective purchasing power of poor consumers, who, spending a substantial 
share of their income on basic foodstuffs (ibid), see their situation further deteriorating. This indicates that 
current attempts to curb poverty have not been able to ameliorate the inexorable effects of external shocks 
like international food and financial crises for the poorest part of the population.  
The second target set out to lower the percentage of “working poor”5. These workers, in spite of 
having jobs, are unable to offset times of crises and low demand for their lack of safety nets and ability to 
generate sufficient savings. Sadly, working poverty in fact is on the rise due to global (financial) crises 
and related declining output per worker/ low productivity of vulnerable employment (ibid) and the 
intimately connected problem of the “vicious cycle of technological progress” described above. Albeit 
these factors holding true for most regions in the world, the demographics constitute an additional, 
specifically developing country influence: CA suffers from an “infantilization of poverty” (ECLAC, 
2010c) due to a demographic structure of an extraordinarily large youth6 unable to escape their social 
heritage of pressing poverty. This means that a disproportionate part of the population of these countries 
is extremely vulnerable and dependent, with little options to escape their “fate”.  
Irrespective of the urgency, reactions to these developments are lethargic. Despite advancements 
reached by existing programs throughout the region, especially CCT programs, efforts do not seem to 
                                                     
5 The “working poor” are defined as those who are employed but live in households where individual members subsist on less 
than $1.25 a day. 




bear sufficient fruit to rid the isthmus from its deep-rooted problems. After over 70% of the time allotted 
to meet the MDG elapsed, only about 60% of the target has been achieved (ECLAC, 2010c). On a more 
positive note, however, the widespread usage of CCT has familiarized the population with monetary 
transfers as such, and is likely to prove an asset when proposing monetary transfer schemes. Nonetheless, 
the MDG cannot be seen as an objective in itself: even should the target of halving poverty levels from 
1990 be met, Central America would still be facing extreme poverty levels affecting more than 20% of its 
population. This is not only a violation of their Human Rights (to dignity, food, etc), but unacceptable 
from a social ethics point of view (Sen, 2008). 
In sum, considering this double rationale for “speeding up” development of urgency and need, 
contrasted by the alarmingly sluggish developments taking place, this paper suggests a change in the 
current development paradigm, away from palliative, short-term oriented charity programs, towards an 
efficient poverty eradication program, a universal, unconditional, rights-based support scheme for the 
region: a Basic Income. The objective of this paper is thus to elaborate and present a scheme that 
addresses the various, interrelated problems of the region by a straightforward and uncomplicated, yet 





II. BASIC INCOME IN A DEVELOPING COUNTRY CONTEXT 
To appropriately comprehend the potential consequences of a BI, it is contextualized and compared to 
existing programs in the region; thereafter obtained insights are applied to the region-specific proposal.  
Conceptually, the Basic Income represents a right to an unconditional, universal cash transfer 
safeguarding access to basic rights such as food and shelter, to all individuals of a defined area, possibly 
bound by citizenship or residence (Basic Income Earth Network, BIEN7). It is universal, meaning 
everybody qualifies, independently of age, gender, income, origin. The fact that it is unconditional means 
that the money is transferred, usually by a government, independently of any behavior by the recipient, 
for instance whether s/he works or not/want to work or not, or of characteristics like level of 
wealth/income and other means tests (Standing 2008; Huerta 2009). 
Scholars from the most diverse backgrounds have advocated the concept of a universal, 
unconditional cash transfer as a means for redistribution of income and poverty alleviation in one form or 
another throughout the last couple of decades: van der Veen & van Parijs (1983/2006) as a “capitalist 
road to communism”; Milton Friedman as a genuinely liberal proposal for a Negative Income Tax (1962), 
Tobin (1968) as an unconditional transfer on the basis of a global transaction tax, and André Gorz in his 
Critique of Economic Reason (1989), to name but a few. Historically, scholars even trace the BI legacy 
back to Thomas Paine’s “Agrarian Justice” (1795)8. 
The concept of BI has, in preceding decades, mainly been developed for high income countries 
(Künnemann, 2004). Also, historic experiments like the Alaska Dividend established in 1982 and still in 
existence, paying in 2010 $1,281 to each citizen9, or the brief phase from 1974-1979 of a Canadian BI in 
“the town with no poverty”, Manitoba (Forget, 2008), are located within the Northern Hemisphere10. 
Consequently, literature on the application of a BI for developing countries is rather scarce. 
Notwithstanding, it is in the global South that the last couple of years have witnessed a growing interest 
for the implementation of a basic income as a means to development for middle- and low-income 
countries. On the basis of these latest developments approaches specifically designed for this hemisphere, 
both on a grassroots level and from the scholarly or political elite, become increasingly significant and 
advocates become aware of the immense potential of the concept for the developing world – and from 
within this most populous and yet poorest part of the globe itself. 
Beyond an academic debate, a couple of Southern countries have moved forward in the process of 
implementing unconditional cash transfers in their constituencies: Brazil approved a law in 2004 
establishing the right to a, gradually implemented, Citizen’s Basic Income for all Brazilian citizens, 
irrespective of their social and economic condition, upholds an unconditional rural pension program 
(Suplicy, 2007), and in 2009 the civil rights group ReCivitas started a BI pilot project in the village of 
Quatinga Velho, where villagers are paid about US$13 per head per month (ReCivitas, 2009). Similarly, 
the settlement of Otjivero in Namibia stars a – privately initiated – successful experiment, while a 
national coalition for the implementation of a guaranteed minimum income is struggling for official 
political endorsement (Haarmann & Haarmann, 2007). In South Africa, Bolivia and Mexico, universal 
                                                     
7 BIEN upholds a webpage with extensive information about BI at www.basicincome.org. 
8 Since this paper is not concerned with history of BI, for historic accounts please refer e.g. to Pereira (2009) or Standing 
(2008), and the bibliography. 
9 Details about Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend Division can be obtained at www.pfd.state.ak.us. 
10 Considering conceptual differences grounded in context, not much space will be devoted to exploring BI in a developed 




pension schemes have been introduced (Yanes, 2008) that grew out of existing conditional programs such 
as the extension of the Mexican conditional transfer program Oportunidades, rural old-age component “70 
y Más” and the unconditional Pension Scheme for elderly over 68 in the Federal District (Yanes, 2010). 
Argentina just amended its conditional transfer program to encompass all children (Rodriguez, 2007); 
further expansions of those and similar existing conditional support programs towards other sectors of the 
population are now being discussed in the public debate. The most recent proposal in the wider region, 
conceived in the aftermath of the massive earthquake in early 2010, advocates a basic income for Haiti, of 
about $10 per person (BIEN, 2010a), while the quick and virtually silent legal establishment of a nation-
wide BI in Iran financed by oil gains this fall has caused some upstir in the community (BIEN, 2010b).  
A number of those designs specifically conceptualized for the developing world are interesting in 
the context of a proposal for Central America. Considering Otjivero in Namibia being the only current 
experiment under sufficient scrutiny and including an entire (though spatially limited) population, it 
serves as an interesting source of empirical data for tentative estimation of impacts on a societal level. 
Künnemann (2004) suggests a minimum food income for the least developed countries to guarantee the 
right to sufficient food intake, anchored as a Human Right by the UN, financed through a combination of 
indirect taxes and international contributions from donor countries. Albeit the suggested level of transfers 
paid at ca. 0.3$ purchasing power parity (PPP) is arguably too low for Central America, his proposal 
offers an elegant solution for poor countries’ finance of the scheme by proposing combined international 
and national financing. On a different premise, Huerta (2008) calculates costs for the implementation of a 
Basic Income in Mexico, as the gradual expansion of the unconditional, universal pension scheme 
implemented in Mexico City from 2000 onwards to eventually cover the entire population (see also 
Yanes, 2008). The geographic and structural/institutional proximity of Mexico to the region under 
scrutiny allows for his calculations to serve as a benchmark to approximate levels in Central America and 
indicate feasibility for the region based on his suggestion for gradual phase-in of the grant. Finally, 
Howard, 2007 poses some important questions relating to BI as a regional program, in his case for a 
“NAFTA Dividend” that is grounded conceptually in the argument of a BI disincentivising labor 
migration in the NAFTA region. Concomitantly, this would be an important step towards reducing 
regional and international inequality. Notwithstanding the different premises in Central America, economic 
migration is an issue there, too, establishing Howard’s proposal as inspirational for a regional proposal. 
To date, Howard’s NAFTA Dividend seems to be the only suggestion for a regional BI in a 
developing country context. Notwithstanding, Central America invites for such a proposal, considering its 
countries’ blatant inequality and poverty levels, on the one hand, while on the other its existing common 
market, relative degree of integration and small country size and existence of funds – although not “well-
distributed” – could facilitate such undertaking Also, certain expectations on behalf of the population 
towards social transfers and extensive experience with CCT11 could prove beneficial. Moreover, it would 
ensure a “regional commitment to poverty eradication” (Howard, 2007), which would further claims of 
the SICA for a regional project and common goal for development. 
Additionally, the overarching regional goal must be embraced collectively to enable such an 
interstate project. 
                                                     
11 All countries in question host CCT programs at the time being: Honduras and Nicaragua both started their programs 
Programa de Asignación Familiar and Red de Protección Social, respectively, in 2000, followed by El Salvador featuring 
Red Solidaria since 2005, in 2007 Costa Rica initiating Avancemos, and finally in 2008 Guatemala joined with its Mi Familia 




III. BENEFITS OF UNCONDITIONAL COMPARED TO  
CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS 
Trying to replicate the achievement of “poster child” programs such as Mexico’s PROGRESA/ 
Oportunidades and Brazil’s Bolsa Familia in the mid-1990s, virtually all Latin American countries started 
their own, more or less successful, CCT programs during the last decade. Lavinas (1998) reviewing 
minimum income schemes throughout Latin America in the 1990s, concludes that these cash transfers have 
a redistributive impact that is non-existent in the traditional compensatory programs, introducing into the 
debate on the restructuring of welfare the idea of basic security for all. Meanwhile, ample evidence of its 
effectiveness has cash transfers becoming increasingly popular throughout the Latin American continent 
(Standing, 2007), overcoming the presumption of an overall trade-off between redistribution or insurance on 
the one hand, and growth on the other (Ravallion, 2003 in Standing 2008). Likewise, following Oxfam 
International (2005, in Howard 2007, p.16), cash transfers are both faster and more effective than most food 
distribution, while “common fears surrounding cash transfers, such as increased risk of insecurity, gambling, 
purchase illicit items or domestic violence, are all unfounded”. While this is a desirable development 
considering additional verified impacts of CCT including for instance linkage effects in the local economy, 
multiplier effects through self investments, and improvements in primary school enrollment (de la Brière & 
Rawlings, 2006) and the positive changes these bring about, a significant number of CCT-related 
shortcomings can be observed and documented, far beyond the mixed impacts on actual school attendance 
and learning identified by de la Brière & Rawlings (2006). Albeit means-tested CCT programs like 
Oportunidades and Bolsa Familia are steps towards the “right direction” and have shown to be less 
expensive than to distribute food aid, “awkward questions remain about the efficiency and equity of the 
selectivity process” (Standing, 2008, p. 25). Considering a poverty percentage of over 70% of the population 
for Honduras, for instance, a mere 17% of those poor are covered by the PRAF12 transfer program. Should 
this be defended as a result of bare shortage of funds, it must be considered that in terms of relative costs, a 
UNDP simulation study from 2005 postulates that cash transfers targeting all children instead of only those 
identifiably poor, “would have a greater poverty reduction effect for an allocation of just 0.5 percent of 
GDP” (Standing, 2008, p. 25). Such statements request further scrutiny comparing conditional to 
unconditional transfers13. Omitting the cost argument (which will be taken up again in Chapter 3) for an 
instance, though, a large number of further, qualitative differences speak in favor of a BI. 
“Welfare Mess” and Reach: While conditional transfers do prove successful in certain aspects, 
they are likely to create a “welfare mess” of “bureaucratic, costly, stigmatizing patchwork of highly 
complex means-tested welfare” that is “riddled with built-in disincentives to work” (Pereira, 2009, p. 6). 
The often overlapping structure of a plethora of existing programs deprives the entire system of the 
necessary efficiency on a macro level – de la Brière & Rawlings, 2006 assert that CCT program’s highest 
costs occur from targeting and conditionality monitoring – whereas its constant monitoring by official 
bureaucracy causes the invasion of privacy on a micro sphere. Whether it is in spite of or due to the 
extensive bureaucracy created, most CCT programs suffer from structural biases; for instance, although 
extreme poverty is more pronounced in rural areas, due to massive rural-urban migration numerically the 
amount of poor in urban areas is larger by now; Johannsen (2009) stipulates that in 2007, 78% of total 
poor where to be found in urban areas14. This bears important implications for the design of programs in a 
context of insufficient information about the population. Moreover, to find out who qualifies for transfer, 
                                                     
12 Programa de Asignación Familiar; Family Assignment Program. 
13 Standing (2008) offers a comprehensive comparison of different transfer and redistribution programs, featuring most 
prominently the comparison of a BI with food aid and CCT including social pensions and the like. Valid comparison on an 
empirical level is very difficult though, due to the lack of data to date. 




means tested schemes require an operational definition of “income”, obstructed by the high incident of 
undocumented incomes in developing countries, with its erratic and substantial fluctuations. Often, thus, 
income proxies such as quality of housing need to be collected and analyzed, involving substantial 
administrative costs (Standing, 2008; Howard 2007). The result of these (practical) difficulties is a very 
uneven and incomplete coverage of the disadvantaged population, frequently not reaching the most 
impoverished in society (Standing, 2008), or only reaching a fraction of those entitled transfers. 
Households with pre-school children, without children, and orphans or others living outside family 
households are not included in education or family programs. Such biases not only further skew poverty 
patterns towards particular groups, the difficulty and costs of implementing the criteria used for 
identifying beneficiaries can lead to merely token or discretionary application of the formal conditions in 
practice (ibid), opening the field for corruption. 
Universal security schemes, on the other hand, are characterized by simple and low-cost 
administration, and a universal reach, while bureaucracy, and its related misuse, would disappear under a 
BI (ibid). By this token, a BI should be conceived of as a right (in line with Human Rights to food, 
shelter, etc), not charity; as such it can be compared to universal suffrage, which is simple enough for 
everybody to be informed about it and have easy access to (Künnemann, 2004). As Howard, 2007 argues, 
a means-test would make the transfer a “compensation for exclusion”, instead of a basic right. Since 
everybody is entitled the same amount, no social stigma is attached to the collection of a transfer, an issue 
often resulting in limited reach of CCT programs. Moreover, by being non-exclusionary, this transfer 
introduces an element of dignity for the individual receiving it, eliminating the pejorative “deserving” and 
“undeserving” poor categories in favor of a sense of unification. 
Poverty and Unemployment Traps: Labor force, especially low-skilled, are prone to fall into 
poverty traps or unemployment traps15, and remain in the informal sector when supported by a means 
testing scheme. Since taxation of additional income and threat of losing transfers makes marginal gains of 
picking up a new job very small, income thresholds for receiving grants effectively function as a 
disincentive to work (Künnemann, 2004; Standing 2008). Conditional transfers impose de facto minimum 
wages, keeping people from taking up jobs (even if they would like to) that earn less than the guaranteed 
minimum income, since this would make them financially worse of than maintaining the subsidy (van der 
Veen & van Parijs, 2006). If, on the other hand, the transfer is unconditional, people start earning 
additional income as soon as they take up work, independently of the magnitude of the wage paid.  
Unconditional programs must nevertheless go hand in hand with public sector policies to 
incorporate informal employment into the formal sector. Removing administrative obstacles to entering 
the formal sector will incentivize further job creation, in order to spread paid, formal employment more 
widely than it is now (ibid), curtail the problem of informal sector and amplify the tax base. 
Simultaneously, through diminishing the danger of falling into the poverty trap, a BI would immeasurably 
reduce the incidence of moral hazards and petty tax evasion on the individual level (Standing, 2008). 
Labor force: Critics, especially in the developed world, tend to discard BI on the presumption that 
welfare encourages “scrounging” (people choose to be unemployed and live off the state transfers rather 
than look for work). However, this choice is encouraged if transfers are means tested rather than universal as 
has been explained above. Moreover, the combination of social assistance and extremely high 
unemployment in a developing country context subverts the often-presumed association between welfare 
and withdrawal from the labor force (Seekings, 2007). Cash transfers do not breed “dependency and 
passivity” it has been shown, but foster independence and activity (Standing, 2008). The argument of poor 
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people not spending incomes responsibly leading to a preference of state transfers “in kind” or pegged to 
certain conditionality, is empirically defeated: very poor households with little access to paid work, have 
been shown to spent money received on basic consumption goods and education and healthcare for family 
members (Schubert, 2005; ReCivitas, 2009), well capable of taking strategic decisions on how to improve 
family livelihood in the medium and long term through responsible spending patterns (Standing, 2008). 
Conditionality: Conditionality, on the other hand, presumes that a poor person is not capable of 
learning to deal with financial issues and acts irrationally, cannot know his/her or her children’s long-term 
interests. According to Standing (2008, p. 18 ), “dealing with those issues directly would surely be more 
effective than imposing behavioral conditions that eat up public resources in administering them, while 
perhaps ignoring the structural factors that impede seemingly rational behavior”. Conditionality like in the 
Brazilian Bolsa Famlia program, for instance, can only be fulfilled when adequate schooling, health and 
transportation infrastructure exists. While this might hold for urban areas throughout the region, the rural 
population is likely to encounter large-scale supply (and demand) side market failures, and might have to 
face large costs and obstacles to comply with the imposition of a clinic-attendance condition, 
disproportionately affecting the poorest (Standing, 2008). Thus, programs with less conditionality imply a 
more efficient and equitable outcome (ibid). 
Macroeconomic effects: In macroeconomic terms, universal schemes are fundamentally market 
neutral, i.e. they do not introduce market distortions, thus having little negative effect on competitiveness: 
BI schemes do not, unlike means tested transfers, introduce negative incentives to dissave. A BI is thus 
not only cheaper than food aid, it is also less damaging to the local economy when local production exists 
in the first place, by not depressing local demand but instead helping to stimulate local markets (Standing, 
2007). Notwithstanding, cash transfers on their own might become inflationary if local food supplies are 
not available. Especially in the aftermath of a disaster, food aid might need to be used complementarily to 
restrain inflationary pressures. Therefore, cash grants are not to be seen as pure alternatives to other forms 
of commodity-based aid, but rather as a complement, to become a central part of development policy 
(Standing, 2008). This also applies in the case of inflationary pressures due to overly rapid growth. It goes 
without saying that complementary policies need to be in place for inequality not to surge around a 
different corner. Empirically, nonetheless, it has been shown that social pensions improve old age poverty 
better than any alternative by being redistributive, affordable and transparent, while counting with low 
administrative costs. Following the African continent’s example, many Latin American countries have 
introduced similar schemes as well, including Bolivia, Brazil, and Mexico City, due to their typically 
small costs relative to GDP. Costa Rica’s pension scheme, for instance, cost 0.3 % of GDP in 1999 (ibid). 
In sum, a BI offers a number of advantages over other development aid programs. Albeit proving 
positive outcomes, means-tested programs still only come into action ex-post, i.e. after poverty has affected 
peoples’ lives profoundly already (Cassadas, 2007). As opposed to such efforts of poverty alleviation that 
try to deal with poverty when it already harms the victims, a BI scheme aims at poverty prevention, and, 
depending on the amount paid out to citizens, effectively rids the region of extreme poverty (overall). It is 
then important to abandon the purely corrective, “patching” strategy of poverty intervention, to come to a 
politics of preventive rationality of empowerment. This does not imply abandoning all existing projects or 
disqualifying success CCT programs did reach, but rather marks a change of direction towards a holistic and 
universally just approach to poverty alleviation. Simultaneously, such a regime can help ridding the region 
from its jungle-like systems of diverse interfering transfer programs. In light of the underlying assumptions 
of innate insecurity in “today’s life” on the one hand, and the defeat of the supposition of full employment, 
on the other, a BI offers a basic minimal security for everybody, while displaying strong redistributive 
effects. This both diminishes people’s fear of losing their job, and substitutes for the debilitation of 




IV. ESTIMATED IMPACT AND MONITORING 
In light of these characteristics of a BI, which impacts can be expected for the region upon the introduction 
of such a scheme? A noteworthy yet by no means exhaustive list of – mutually reinforcing – issues affected 
will be outlined below. 
A. SHORT TERM 
Poverty Alleviation and Food Security: The immediate effect, as is necessary to repeat, is the eradication of 
extreme poverty, and parallel relative poverty alleviation. Importantly, a BI would ensure food security by 
providing some level of income security. Upon introduction of the scheme in Namibia, child malnutrition 
plummeted from 42% to 17% in only six months (Jauch, 2010)16. By securing nutrition, a BI becomes a 
human capital investment (Haarmann & Haarmann, 2007) in future productivity that, taking into account 
cumulative levels, points towards a high multiplier effect of improved health/physical condition leading to 
improved education to better jobs to higher income, additional to the intrinsic value of the individual stages 
improved. Since current chronic child malnutrition levels in Guatemala are even higher at comparably high 
inequality levels, similar impact can be expected. Consequently, it is especially the young population that 
benefits from the introduction of such a scheme, through its profound implications for future productivity. 
The generally improved health through better nutrition (and possibly hygiene) will additionally lower costs 
of an overstrained public health system. 
Growth: However, the introduction of a BI in the region will have additional important 
macroeconomic impacts. For one, a large effect on GDP can be expected, considering the growth 
generated from an increase in private consumption (due to more disposable income yet low savings rates 
in the region), augmentation of productivity in the medium and long term and possibly competitiveness, 
as well as an amplified internal market (through the inclusion of a large part of the population formerly 
excluded on the basis of lack of income). Anticipated autochthonous growth rates based on the private 
consumption levels will be estimated below. 
Wage dynamics: A BI will have important impact on the wage dynamics by pushing up wages for 
unattractive, unrewarding work once no-one is forced to accept it to survive (van der Veen & van Parijs, 
2006). Thus, even if a BI would create small negative effects on employment upon introduction as some 
critics argue, these would be offset by the positive effects on labor-market participation (Seekings, 2007). 
Meanwhile, through the partial decoupling of income and wage labor, workers “get a stronger position to 
deny demeaning and exploitative working conditions” without fear of losing livelihood (Künnemann, 
2004). What is more, empirical evidence from Namibia states that beneficiaries saw their household 
incomes increase substantially “over and above” the value of the actual transfer payments. While 
household incomes from wages surpassed those by 19%, income from farming allegedly increased by 
36%, and from self-employment even by 301% during the first year (Jauch, 2010). Disregarding the 
comparable sectoral composition, these numbers might appear very optimistic for the region in question; 
however, similar trends could be expected here, too. Regardless, Künnemann (2004) explains that 
individuals may chose, or be forced to, not to use the opportunities in the market or common sector and 
                                                     
16 Considering the limited number of existing cases as mentioned above, empirical evidence where cited for comparison, 
derives from the Namibian pilot project in Otjivero, being the most carefully studied and at the same time most apt for 
comparison with CA at the time being: Both are among the most unequal areas in the world, part of the developing countries 
“club” and with similar sectoral compositions. With the exception of Guatemala, all have a rather small population although 




thus not receive a “decent income”; however, they would continue enjoying their right to a minimum 
income, which does not discriminate between waged labor and other forms of work comprising care and 
non-profit work for the common good, including education, and domestic work, the latter still mostly 
executed by women (Samson, 2004 and others; in Standing, 2008). 
Civil registration and Tax evasion: Independently of a person’s general occupation, since 
transfers are granted over some sort of registration system, families are incentivized to register their 
children upon birth, as well as allowing for a “proper” registration/formalization of the entire population, 
and thus promoting a public sector’s better knowledge of the population and its needs. This has 
significant social implications including identity issues on the one hand, while on the other, by combining 
increased registration with a simplified tax system, tax evasion can be reduced significantly, increasing 
the tax base and thus the state’s financing power of the program, and inducing further redistribution. 
Foundations for this development are laid already in the short-term, while full advantage of such changes 
can be reaped in the medium- and long-run. 
B. MEDIUM TERM 
Education: Providing families with “income” for their children will enable those to go to school instead of 
being obliged to work for basic survival, this way activating the multiplier effect of both lowered incidence 
of child labor and youth criminality, and furthering education17. Again, empirical evidence from Namibia 
shows that school dropout rates upon introduction of the BI diminished from 30-40% to 5% in half a year, 
and after one year reached a level of virtually nil (Jauch, 2010). Furthermore, with more parents able to pay 
school fees, the schools’ stronger financial situation will improve teaching materials for pupils. Transfers 
will also incentivize young adults to continue schooling up to technical and professional training or 
university, if they are not exposed to the fierce obligation to take the “first best” job once leaving school, but 
are enabled to increase their chances for decent work improving their productivity. This, ultimately, 
improves options for value added production in the country. At the same time it is likely to lower violence 
significantly (Namibia saw a reduction in its crime rates of 42% following Jauch, 2010), considering that 
especially the youth is prone to get mixed up with (violent) criminal activity. 
Inequality: The other main result will be a positive impact on inequality through redistribution of 
income, especially if it goes hand in hand with a progressive tax reform as indicated above. This income 
redistribution will have significant welfare effects and further elevate demand (Huerta, 2009), implying 
both a broadening and deepening of the home market through endogenous consumption and savings. In 
combination with the increase in productivity workers’ upgrading will bring, employment opportunities 
will grow significantly (ibid). 
Security and Entrepreneurialism: Economic insecurity prevents people from taking 
entrepreneurial risks, because it leaves them with the choice of either buying food for the day to survive, 
or risking delayed or no returns by investing the money into self-employment. Quite understandably, 
many people choose personal and family survival as a priority over an entrepreneurial commitment. 
Notwithstanding, in CA self-employment is responsible for roughly 40% of regional employment 
(ICAES). From an economic point of view, thus, a BI is productive, since it fosters risk-taking and 
innovation18 (Standing, 2008) without jeopardizing livelihood, providing income security that can free 
resources for entrepreneurial investment (Haarmann & Haarmann, 2007). Related, social grants also 
                                                     
17 Implementation of the system in Namibia had the number of parents paying for school fees double (to 90%) (Jauch 2010). 
18 In Europe, upon its introduction, “old-age security acted as a powerful force in modernizing agriculture” because it led to 




provide potential labor market participants with the necessary security to invest in higher risk-higher 
return job search, since they can travel further, prepare and educate themselves better than in the pressing 
situation of being forced to accept the first offer, no matter how “inconvenient”. Michael Samson found a 
correlation in 2004 between living in households receiving social grants and a higher success rate in 
finding employment, due to improved productivity – which again results in higher wage increases (ibid). 
Once the system is established, it will thus have important effects on macroeconomic stability, 
ameliorating potential negative effects of future crises. 
Empowerment: Since the transfers are paid to individuals, not to units such as families or 
households, they have an important empowerment effect, especially for vulnerable groups often unable to 
obtain their own, legitimate, incomes, such as women, children, elderly, and indigenous, possibly 
changing/shrinking dependency patterns within the family, e.g. through gender emancipation. Moreover, 
self-esteem and confidence will increase on an individual and group level. The pilot project in Namibia 
has shown that community participation increases markedly with the introduction of a BI, by committee-
building, counseling each other on how to improve their lives with the money received and general 
community mobilization and empowerment (Jauch, 2010). The impact on personal liberty should not be 
taken lightly either, considering that it will free energies to act as a responsible and concerned citizen 
whose voice is to be taken into account. Besides increasing self-determination in relation to choice of life 
paths for individuals, this development is of utmost importance for the eventual creation of a more active 
civil society in the region, autonomously addressing its own problems. 
C. LONG TERM 
Migration: It is well-appreciated that migration is a phenomenon not to be associated with extreme poverty, 
but rather with “simply” poor households. Notwithstanding, since a BI also supports the next-poorest 
income groups, significant effects on migration patterns can be assumed to materialize in the longer run. 
However, the intention of curbing migration – from South to North, rural to urban etc – is a two-edged 
knife: for significant reduction of migration, remittances need to be taken into consideration. Today, they 
have reached more than double the size of net official flows, second only to FDI as external source of 
finance for developing countries (Howard, 2007), and thus play a pivotal role in local development, and its 
impact on the national economies should not be underestimated. On the other hand, it becomes clear that 
remittances cannot compensate for the losses of migration in terms of brain drain, dysfunctional families 
and demographic changes in the countries of origin. Since most migrants in the region flee from the 
economic circumstances and for lack of options at home, it is here that circumstances have to be changed. If 
those conditions are addressed directly instead of propelling ever-stricter migration control, perversely 
feeding into organized criminality (e.g. the coyotes), i.e. they can survive at home, most people will not feel 
the same need to migrate. In other words, incentives have to be created for staying, instead of enforcing 
disincentives to leaving, which will never be as effective considering the current push – no “future” at home 
– and pull – strong demand for immigrant labor in host countries – factors in the wider area. A BI in many 
cases can prove a reasonable alternative for citizens considering migration, while at the same time buffering 
the impact of loss of these remittances on the local economy already in the short- and medium-term. The BI 
transfers would take over the role as seed money for rural/local economic development, supplying not only 
those households with migrant workers, but all households (Howard, 2007). This way, transfer policies do 
not have to be intrinsically connected to migration policies for having a positive impact on the issue by 
reducing local desperation and inequality over time, and thereby assuaging the underlying causes leading to 
mass migration (ibid). In the even longer term, as jobs are created, poverty declines and income differences 




Self-esteem and Social Cohesion: A BI helps strengthening social solidarity and reinforces 
community and social cohesion, while – being universal – it is non-stigmatizing (Raventós, 2007). 
Receiving a dignified income affects people’s self-esteem and confidence, and will positively encourage 
and motivate people that today are marginalized and suffering, and often have lost belief in their own 
capabilities (Fryer, 1992). Yanes (2010) asserts that social relations as well as usage of public space 
among Mexico City’s elderly changed dramatically, when they started to conceptualize themselves as a 
solidary in-group upon introduction of the unconditional pension scheme. Socio-economically, 
beneficiaries become autonomous economic and social actors of a community through taking their own 
decisions on how to spend the money (Standing, 2008). This will also change dependency ratios (old 
versus young, working to non-working) both on a family- and societal level. Making the transition to 
universal “social and economic security” coverage now, can become an important advantage in the future, 
when demographic changes such as the inevitable aging of the population will make those measures 
indispensable. Dealing with these changes at a point where costs can be borne by the largest part of the 
population instead of a small percentage of younger people in the future will prove less expensive, and 
politically feasible. 
Taken together, it becomes clear that important cross-country benefits can be obtained from the 




V. THE REGIONAL BASIC INCOME PROPOSAL 
After having shed light on the contextual and conceptual particularities and expected impacts of a BI in CA, 
in the following the proposal for the region will be elaborated. 
The overarching, ultimate goal of the proposal is the complete coverage of the Central American 
population by a secured income above the extreme poverty threshold, as described below19. Although a 
broad and multifaceted conception of poverty as capacity deprivation (Sen, 2008) such as pictured in the 
introduction is embraced as the more realistic picture of the true nature of the problem, this paper, chiefly 
for sake of clarity and comparability, deliberately makes use of the – rather limited – international 
definition of extreme poverty as personal income below $1,25 PPP per day, irrespective of local 
deviations20. It can be argued that this constitutes a gross omission of real differences on the local level 
and thus ignorance to the special needs of specific groups of individuals. However, this paper does not 
pretend to address these special needs at all; rather, it aims at creating a different minimum for everybody 
below which nobody can fall (Fourier, 1803). This means that differentiated needs beyond a basic 
security continue to exist, and will have to be addressed appropriately and independently, beyond the 
reach of a BI and the scope of this proposal. 
A. BASIC INCOME LEVEL 
A explained above, this paper uses the extreme poverty line of 1,25 International Dollars per day as the 
threshold, both for reasons of simplicity and the need to establish a comparative level among the countries 
of the region. Moreover, it surpasses the “food security income”, below which there is a definite risk of 
hunger and malnutrition (Künnemann, 2004)21. To lift people out of extreme poverty, it is thus necessary to 
guarantee them an income of above 1,25 international dollars at PPP per day, or the equivalent of 37,5 
dollars per month in their national currency. The resulting amounts are calculated and presented in Table 1 
below for the countries of the region, both in US$ converted amounts based on a PPP conversion rate22 and 
in local currency equivalents. This means that the region will be covered by an “equal but differentiated” 
cash transfer: differentiated in that it takes local differences in costs of living into account, equal since 
purchasing power of the individuals covered will presumably rise by the sake token23. In other words, the 
proposal considers a program that is uniform, for sake of comparability, and differentiated, for sake of 
                                                     
19 To adequately evaluate the results and ensure desirable outcome, trustworthy and reliable indicators need to be identified and 
subsequently tested regularly. Including indicators for the different realms of life affected, the monitoring of the program 
allows for a more valid outcome, since potential flaws in its structure/composition can be corrected rapidly. Furthermore, 
close monitoring permits adjusting levels correctly should changes in the macro economy ask for that. Depending on 
observed outcomes, strategic changes can be undertaken in the set-up and timeliness of the program. 
20 This is because there is no consistency throughout the region on measuring (national) poverty using income and measuring it 
using expenditures. This lack of consistency makes it difficult to compare rates of poverty in different LAC countries. 
Consider, for instance, Honduras, where 72% of the population in 2005 lived below the country's poverty line, while 36% 
lived on less than $2 a day, or Chile with 5% of the population living on less than $2 a day, but 19% below the country's 
poverty line. By contrast, in Jamaica about 22% of people lived below the country's poverty line, but 43% made less than $2 
a day, and in El Salvador the numbers were 39% and 41%, respectively (Perry et al. 2006). 
21 Obviously, only elementary food needs can be covered by 1.25 $. Such income (in cash or kind) is seen as necessary (but not 
necessarily sufficient) for food security, while such a crude quantification certainly does not cover the human right to food 
(Künnemann 2004). 
22 IMF 2010 suggested rates. Alternatively, ECLAC indigence lines could be considered, implying somewhat higher levels and 
thus costs for most countries considered. 
23 Self-evidently, probably significant within-country differences exist in purchasing power and costs of living. However, 





“fairness”, i.e. larger dividends would be going to the wealthier countries, smaller ones to the poorer. This 
option would make poverty reduction “a shared goal of the region” where everyone receives “a tangible 
benefit of the scheme of cooperation” (Howard, 2007, p. 3), while it simultaneously also avoids BI-enticed 
migration within the region. 
TABLE 1 
MONTHLY TRANSFERS PER CAPITA UNDER A REGIONAL BASIC INCOME  
FOR THE REGION OF CENTRAL AMERICA 
Country Total population (Millions) 
Monthly transfer 
/capita (dollars) 
 Monthly transfer 
(local currency) a/ 
GDP (Million 
dollars) 
Costa Rica 4.58 27.00  13600.50 33 180.00 
El Salvador 6.16 18.75  18.75 21 810.00 
Guatemala 14.36 21.66  173.25 39 760.00 
Honduras 7.47 17.22  325.88 15 290.00 
Nicaragua 5.74 13.67  293.63 6 250.00 
      
Central America 38.31 20.00 b/  116 290.00 
Source: own construction, based on CELADE/ECLAC: 
http://www.eclac.org/celade/proyecciones/basedatos_BD.htm.  
a/ Local Currency Exchange rate XE.com 12.08.2010. 
b/  Regional average. 
 
Comparison with existing programs of conditional transfers: A further rationale for defining the level 
at its designated position is the comparison with existing CCT programs, illustrated by the case of Guatemala: 
Since 2008, under the program of Mi Familia Progresa (MIFAMPRO) the Guatemalan 
government pays 150 Quetzals (Q) per family for Education, if these have at least one child of age 6-15, 
and 150Q for Health24. This means that a family, independently of how many members it has, will receive 
a maximum of 300Q a month, on the conditionality of the family’s timely compliance with the schooling 
and health requirements. Under all conceivable family constellations, a BI will always grant a higher 
actual income than MIFAMPRO, if and when its level is superior to 150Q (US$18.68), which it is in the 
proposal at hand. For a simulated family of two parents with two children, MIFAMPRO will pay 300Q, 
while the same family would receive 693Q under the proposed BI regime (173.25Q per head). Moreover, 
there is no threat to take away the benefit from the individual, allowing recipients to include transfers in 
their long-term life plans, leading to differing investment patterns. Further differences laid down above 
come into action: MIFAMPRO only aims at covering those in extreme poverty, of which, however, the 
program can only reach those covered by the term “family”, and even those only partially. A BI, 
conversely, would also alleviate the situation for families that are just minimally above any defined 
threshold. This is crucial because wherever a conditionality of some income threshold is considered, those 
immediately above but still very poor are excluded, and thus incited to cheat, as is a family becoming 
slightly too “rich” to qualify for the grant, describing the infamous poverty traps mentioned above. 
Moreover, a BI by virtue of being universal also covers non-families, i.e. poor people outside a family 
constellation of whatever sort such as orphans, elderly, young adults over 15 years old, and families with 
older children.  
Other programs throughout the region rely on similar ranges of transfers, suggesting that the level 
of the present proposal is comparatively competitive. Self-evidently, this does not allow for any 
                                                     




assumption on real costs in financial terms of the programs compared. Although the paper would have 
liked to compare costs of the two programs to estimate relative efficiency, it does not seem possible 
unfortunately to obtain complete and/or unbiased numbers for the costs of the program to the Guatemalan 
public sector, beyond the insight that it received loans over US$350 Million from the Inter-American 
Development Bank. Notwithstanding, the case of Mexico City could serve as an illustration: in 2010, the 
Federal District government spend over MN$10 Billion on direct transfers alone 
(www.educacion.df.gob.mx). Divided over a population of about 8.8 Million citizens in its jurisdiction, 
this would suffice for monthly transfers of almost MN$ 100 to every citizen throughout the year. This 
amounts to more than half the amount suggested for Nicaragua in this proposal.  
B. PHASING-IN 
Universal coverage is not to be achieved instantaneously and needs to be inserted gradually: to ameliorate 
the start-up costs of such an endeavor, implementation of the full proposal is divided into five individual 
phases25, each including one additional part of the population. How to divide these groups? A convenient 
separation, grounded in the demographic structure and existing support programs for its two extremes in the 
region, could be dividing the population by age group. Due to the region’s very young average population, 
immediate impact will be extensive upon the inclusion of the entire youth of the region into a program 
providing for their basic wellbeing since earliest age. Physical and mental development of the new 
generations will be significantly impacted. For Guatemala, particularly, a category of age 0-20 would imply 
roughly half its population! To buffer the costs an inclusion of such large part of the population at once 
would imply, the phases are delimited as follows: in the first year, children aged up to 14 years will be 
covered; the second phase sees the incorporation of the youth between 15 and 24 years. In the third phase, 
the BI is extended to those residents over 65; by the time of phase fourth all those between 50-64 years join, 
for the program to finally, in the fifth phase, cover all citizens (phases will be described in more detail 
below). Additionally, inclusion can proceed following local poverty maps. This option allows for the 
coverage of the socially and economically most vulnerable part of the population and simultaneously that 
with the biggest impact on future productivity and security, first, followed by incorporation of the other 
groups by decreasing urgency. At the same time, this implementation configuration allows for a gradual 
transfer from existing conditional programs to the new universal scheme26. 
C. COSTS 
As can be deduced from Table 1 above, considerable intraregional differences exist concerning the monthly 
transfers. Based on its comparatively high GDP and relatively small population, it can be seen from Figure 1 
below that Costa Rica is the country in the region facing least relative costs upon introduction of the 
program. In contrast, Nicaragua, despite an only slightly larger population, is the country facing highest 
relative implementation costs due to its low GDP. Guatemala, on the other hand, faces highest absolute costs 
as can be appreciated in Figure 1, based on its population size exceeding the double of the other countries. 
Besides absolute GDP size, the first year shows to be particularly costly for Nicaragua due to its 
demographic structure: just like Guatemala, its population on average is much younger than Costa Rica’s, 
resulting in a high percentage of the population in this category. This means that implementation of the 
                                                     
25 Phases could, but do not need to, be considered years. Different (structural) factors might inhibit the timely implementation 
of phases in reality. 
26 Should existing transfers exceed the BI level, both programs can be thought of as a complementary support rather. 
Beneficiaries will continue receiving the same support (or more), while the –so far excluded – rest of the population will be 




proposal will impact differently according to country. In terms of cost, Costa Rica would need only 4% of 
its GDP to include its entire population, while Guatemala would require 9% and Nicaragua even 15%27. 
Notwithstanding, these numbers are misleading in the sense that they describe absolute costs, should the 
entire population be covered at once, irrespective of growth generated in the meantime, and were no 
external sources of finance included. Factually, for the region as a whole, the average cost per phase is of 
1.5%, overall costs for one phase never exceed 2.8% of GDP, which is the level of the first phase, and the 
third year is with 0.41% the least expensive phase on a regional average. Significantly, after having 
implemented the first three phases, with a cost of 4.8% of regional GDP, 60% of the most vulnerable 
population of Central America would be covered.  
FIGURE 1 






















A.   Absolute Costs per Year of Implementation























B.  Cost as Percentage of GDP per Year
Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua
 
Source: own construction. 
 
Moreover, turning to Table 3 with the current public social expenditure of the country governments 
for the region, the numbers of the present proposal might not seem as overwhelming anymore. 
                                                     
27 The numbers used in these different phases do not include cumulative growth, i.e. program-induced GDP growth is not added 
in the consecutive phases. Self-evidently, this results in much higher costs for the phases following Phase One than will be 
the case in reality. Notwithstanding, the rationale for using every year’s GDP with the base value of 2010 estimates for 
calculating costs for the respective phase is that, this way, phases (especially among countries) are easily comparable; 
moreover, in case of alternation of phases (absolute) calculations still hold, making them exchangeable in case of necessity: 
should introduction of phases not coincide among the individual countries, numbers would still hold, allowing for certain 
flexibility to take national context into account. Expected growth, then, will be considered later in connection with financing 
of the proposal. Clearly, to make the calculations “more realistic”, a number of contingent factors would have to be included: 
inflation, population growth, annual expected growth of the economy, both program-generated, and “autochthonous”. 
However, these factors, in terms of their inflating or depressing effect on the costs, can be assumed to cancel each other out 
for the purpose at hand, and for sake of clarity, are excluded. The numbers presented here are approximations, illustrating that 
the proposal is feasible in economic/finance terms. Therefore, monies reallocated from existing programs towards a BI that 






YEARLY COSTS OF TRANSFERS FOR THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION 
Country Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua Central America a/ 
Monthly transfer/person 
(dollars) 27.00 18.75 21.66 17.22 13.67  
Phase 1 Age 0-14 % 25.3 31.5 41.5 36.8 34.5 33.9 
 Cost % GDP 1.13 2 3.9 3.72 5.2 2.8 
Phase 2 Age 15-24 % 19 20.4 20.3 21.3 21.4 20.5 
 Cost % GDP 0.85 1.3 1.91 2.15 3.23 1.59 
Phase 3 Age 65+ % 6.5 7.3 4.4 4.3 4.6 5.4 
 Cost % GDP 0.29 0.46 0.41 0.43 0.69 0.41 
Subtotal 
Phase 
1-3 % Population  
50.8 59.2 66.2 62.4 60.5 59.8 
 Cost % GDP 2.27 3.76 6.22 6.3 9.12 4.8 
Phase 4 Age 50-64 % 12.5 10.2 7.2 7.7 8.2 9.2 
 Cost % GDP 0.56 0.65 0.68 0.78 1.24 0.68 
Phase 5 Age 25-49 % 36.7 30.6 26.6 29.9 31.3 31 
 Cost % GDP 1.64 1.95 2.5 3.02 4.72 2.34 














Source: own construction, based on CELADE (2009), IMF (2010); exchange rate: www.XE.com, 12.08.2010. 
a/  Central America; regional average. 
b/ Includes all Phases. In parenthesis: Costs as % of GDP  
 
TABLE 3 
PUBLIC SOCIAL EXPENDITURE AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP IN CENTRAL AMERICA IN 2009 




2009 (% GDP 17.2 11.1 7.4 11.4 11.6 11.74 
Source: own construction, based on SICA and ECLAC. 
Real differences, notwithstanding, do not only bear important implications that have to be 
considered for financing the scheme, they also offer the opportunity to construct a “regional solidarity 
plan” of differentiated obligations, if member countries commit themselves to prosper as a region, and 
combat intraregional inequality and poverty beyond their national borders. The importance of 
achievements in the fight against poverty on a regional level for an economically and culturally, and 
recently especially in terms of security interdependent and –related area cannot be understated. 
Implementation of the proposal would then not only strengthen ties within the region, but ultimately 
strengthen the region’s position towards the outside. 




VI. THE FIVE PHASES OF THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS 
A. PHASE ONE 
In the first year, the transfer would be paid to children aged 0-14. It is the most expensive phase since the 
percentage share of the population in this age group is the largest for all countries. However, in terms of 
future productivity this is a specifically important phase: as elaborated above, effects on health, education, 
levels of child labor are crucial for economic and social development. Moreover, this phase creates the basis 
for Phase Two by capacitating youngsters for higher education thanks to their having completed primary 
schooling first. This group would become the first to be protected universally by a social security, marking 
the beginning of an integral reform process of the social security system (Barbeito & LoVuolo, 2009). 
TABLE 4 
PHASE ONE: COSTS OF COVERING CENTRAL AMERICAN CITIZENS  
AGED 0-14 WITH A BASIC INCOME 
Phase 1 Age 0-14  (%) a/ 
Total cost  
(Million dollars) Cost as % of GDP 
Costa Rica 25.3 375.25 1.13 
El Salvador 31.5 436.73 2.00 
Guatemala 41.5 1 549.18 3.90 
Honduras 36.8 568.41 3.72 
Nicaragua 34.5 325.05 5.20 
Central America 33.9 3 254.62 2.80 
Source: own construction, a/ based on CELADE/ECLAC.  
Costs for implementation of this phase vary greatly among the countries: while Costa Rica faces a 
1.13 % of its GDP, Nicaragua confronts 5.2%. Beyond GDP size, this discrepancy is mostly explained by 
the different demographic structure among countries: in Guatemala, for instance, over 41% of the 
population is younger than 15 years, incrementing costs for this phase. Notwithstanding, it is also 
Nicaragua and Guatemala that consequently can expect the highest program-generated growth rates, and 
most impact on their future productivity given the large share of their population, which is about to enter 
the economically productive age, affected by the measure.  
B. PHASE TWO 
The second phase sees the integration of the group of youth between 15 and 24 years. After having started 
with the group most important in terms of future productivity and education (i.e. the children), the 
integration of this next group will have the strongest effects on security and reduction of criminality, in view 
of this being the population group most vulnerable to organized crime recruitment and victimization 
(Cantón, 2010). Young people are encouraged to follow their own self-chosen life paths as opposed to being 
forced into (illicit) careers including drug trafficking and prostitution. Instead, this phase incentivizes youth 
to continue studying after a basic education and improve their options for the future by increasing their 
human capital.  
The second phase will be somewhat less expensive than the preceding one, albeit being costly 
nonetheless in comparison to the following phases. All countries have a similar proportion of 15-24 year 
old citizens (about 20%), yet costs as percentage of GDP still differ – between 0.85 % for Costa Rica and 





PHASE TWO: COSTS OF COVERING CENTRAL AMERICAN CITIZENS  
AGED 15-24 WITH A BASIC INCOME 
Phase 2 Age 15-24 (%)a/ Total cost (Million dollars) Cost as% of GDP 
Costa Rica 19 281.81 0.85 
El Salvador 20.4 282.84 1.30 
Guatemala 20.3 757.79 1.91 
Honduras 21.3 329.00 2.15 
Nicaragua 21.4 201.63 3.23 
Central America 20.5 1 853.06 1.59 
Source: own construction, a/ based on CELADE/ECLAC 
C. PHASE THREE 
In the third phase the elderly will be included, i.e. those citizens aged 65 and older. The rationale for 
covering this group now is twofold: for one, it is a fairly small group, meaning that this year will be the least 
expensive in terms of paid out monies. Furthermore, in many countries some sort of pension scheme already 
exists, which can be supplemented. This means that infrastructure probably already exists where a transfer 
system is in place, lowering costs for registration, just as likely holds for the first phase. Thus, urgency of 
including this group is lower. Nonetheless, as stated above, the elderly is a specifically vulnerable age 
group, given that they reach a stage where they become physically unable to provide for themselves. 
TABLE 6 
PHASE THREE: COSTS OF COVERING CENTRAL AMERICAN CITIZENS  
AGED 65 AND OLDER WITH A BASIC INCOME 
Phase 3 Age 65+ (%)a/ Total Cost (Million dollars) Cost as% of GDP 
Costa Rica 6.5 96.47 0.29 
El Salvador 7.3 101.21 0.46 
Guatemala 4.4 164.25 0.41 
Honduras 4.3 66.42 0.43 
Nicaragua 4.6 43.34 0.69 
Central America 5.4 471.69 0.41 
Source: own construction, a/ based on CELADE/ECLAC 
It can be seen from the graph that costs are relatively modest in this phase, lying between Costa 
Rica’s 0.29% and Nicaragua’s 0.69% of GDP. Upon conclusion of this phase, between half and two 
thirds of the population (depending on the country) are protected through the BI scheme. 
D. PHASE FOUR 
The first three years cover the elderly, children and the youth, considered the most vulnerable groups of 
society. Also, implementation at the lower end of the age scale will have the most pronounced effects on 
growth and “upgrading” of the entire country. The fourth phase now allows for the inclusion of the 50-64 
year old, only slightly more expensive than the prior phase due to a somewhat larger part of the population 




available jobs for this age group, especially considering better educated and prepared youth, this group 
becomes increasingly vulnerable as well. 
This fourth phase is the second smallest in term of population integrated, and of costs, remaining 
below 0.8 % for all countries but Nicaragua. After this phase every citizen below 25 and above 50 will be 
covered, for a cost equivalent to less than 5.5% of regional GDP. 
TABLE 7 
PHASE FOUR: COSTS OF COVERING CENTRAL AMERICAN CITIZENS  
AGED 50-64 WITH A BASIC INCOME 
Phase 4 Age 50-64 (%)a/ Total cost (Million dollars) Cost as% of GDP 
Costa Rica 12.5 185.40 0.56 
El Salvador 10.2 141.42 0.65 
Guatemala 7.2 268.77 0.68 
Honduras 7.7 118.93 0.78 
Nicaragua 8.2 77.26 1.24 
Central America 9.2 791.78 0.68 
Source: own construction. 
a/ based on CELADE/ECLAC 
E. PHASE FIVE 
The final phase includes the integration of the remainder of the population into the program, those aged 25 to 
49. This is the most productive part of the population, and thus by assumption the one that is “less urgent” to 
include in comparison to the others. Nonetheless, extreme poverty also in this category needs to be eradicated. 
Furthermore, an important number of benefits accrue from the inclusion of this part of the population: labor 
market changes, augmentation of bargaining power of workers, minimum wage and private sector effects to 
recap some factors enlisted above. In the longer run, migration patterns are likely to change. 
TABLE 8 
PHASE FIVE: COSTS OF COVERING CENTRAL AMERICAN CITIZENS  
AGED 25-49 WITH A BASIC INCOME 
Phase 5 Age 25-49 (%)a/ Total cost (Million dollars) Cost as% of GDP 
Costa Rica 36.7 544.33 1.64 
El Salvador 30.6 424.25 1.95 
Guatemala 26.6 992.97 2.50 
Honduras 29.9 461.83 3.02 
Nicaragua 31.3 294.90 4.72 
Central America 31.0 2 718.29 2.34 
Source: own construction. 
a/ based on CELADE/ECLAC 
This fifth phase incorporates the remainder of citizens, for the countries in question about a third 
of total population or somewhat less. Since this is the second largest proportion (after the first phase), it is 




VII. FINANCING A REGIONAL BASIC INCOME 
From the numbers presented, it becomes clear that should the whole program be auto-financed, cost burdens 
are differentiated throughout the region and extensive in some countries. Nicaragua, for instance, would face 
considerably high costs as percentage of GDP. However, this is not outright an impediment to the proposal. 
As Standing (2008, p.25) holds, “the cost of cash transfers is not the primary issue, since even poor 
countries could afford modest schemes, and most could do so if more aid were diverted to that end”. This 
statement encapsulates various important aspects. For one, costs are relative, considering the extensive 
positive impacts on the entire population implementation of the proposal would have. Secondly, countries 
can adapt the transfer level to their capacities, like proposed in this paper. Thirdly, considerable monies will 
be freed from other programs that become obsolete, and should be employed first (Huerta, 2008), for 
instance transfers by the Guatemalan MIFAMPRO program and the remaining countries' counterparts28. 
A. TAX RESOURCES 
A BI could be almost exclusively financed through a more efficient and just tributary system, in 
combination with the state subsidies system in place today. To achieve this, first and foremost, a tax reform 
based on equity is needed, and tax evasion must be combated strictly. This point is extraordinarily 
important, considering that for Costa Rica, for instance, evasion represented 3.6% of GDP in 2009 
(Mayorga 2010) – an amount only slightly inferior to the total cost of the BI system proposed covering the 
entire population. The situation invites to assume that in the remaining countries of the region evasion lies at 
similar or even higher levels29, and thus impact even more on redistribution policies of governments, 
reaching levels that could cover the costs of the proposal. Incidentally, El Salvador faces a situation where 
only 1-3% of its companies are tax registered (IADB, 2010). This describes a de facto subsidy, or transfer, 
for (big) companies. When recollected, it can be counted towards the “disposable resources” for a  
– comparatively infinitesimal – cash transfer to citizens instead (del Val, 2007). This requires, however, for 
tax systems to be simplified greatly, and hurdles and time required to comply with tax regimes, decreased. 
With complexity reduced, improving tax collection, especially towards the higher income spheres 
is Huerta's (2008) suggestion for financing a BI. He suggests progressively taxing everybody receiving 
income above the basic income level, implying that higher end income receivers pay much more than 
they will actually receive from this system, guaranteeing redistribution of resources. Independently of the 
final threshold level, this way, as opposed to general resource and value-added taxes, it can be avoided to 
“charge” the poorest population disproportionately. The additional advantage of financing over income 
tax is that every citizen will be (tax) registered when applying for the transfer. Thus, the data base of the 
population will be enhanced and since the same tributary number is used, compliance with tax regimes 
can be controlled easily for any commercial or financial transaction. Beyond restraining tax evasion, this 
base will serve demographic research purposes. 
Howard (2007) calculates that a doubling of tax rates of top 10% of income earners for the NAFTA 
region would allow for a BI of US$1,000 per person in the region. These calculations imply that a modest 
increase of tax level for the upper decile would probably suffice to finance the greater part of the transfers 
                                                     
28 It has to be emphasized at this point that, even though parts of the money used for these programs could be transferred to a basic 
income, financing the latter will not divert resources from the current system related for instance to education or health beyond 
the reach of a BI, but substitute any conditional subsidy for an unconditional one should the former be lower (Huerta 2008). 
29 ICEFI estimates that in El Salvador and Guatemala evasion levels represent 3.2%, and 5.4% of GDP, respectively, with levels 




for a much lower transfer level30. However, other forms of taxation could be considered, including value-
added, resource, and private sector profit tax, the latter based on the rationale of companies’ strong impact 
on existing inequality patterns31 (Huerta 2008)32. 
B. PORTFOLIO FINANCING 
Moreover, countries in the region do not have to rely exclusively on internal sources, but could combine 
these with international cash flows, and maybe regional funds. This combination would, especially in the 
initial years of implementation, alleviate costs and concurrently minimize risks of such extensive a program. 
In the case of the Mexican Oportunidades program, for instance, between the years 2005 and 2009 almost 
half of financing lay with the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) (IADB, 2006)33. This way, to 
ameliorate start-up costs, a regional BI program could be co-financed with partner countries’ ODA, 
international and intergovernmental organizations such as the IADB or World Bank. Conceivably, a 
percentage of national finance could be specified, leaving the remainder to be financed through international 
transfers. It could for instance be agreed that each member country directs four percent of its GDP (roughly 
the total cost for Costa Rica), divided over the individual phases, to the program. Alternatively, phase-bound 
thresholds of between 0.5-1% could be considered. This way, again, responsibilities are “equal but 
differentiated” for the individual countries and ensure ability to proceed with the scheme irrespective of 
their different income levels. As distribution becomes more equal, poverty declines, and tax base 
rises/evasion diminishes, own full financing should be considered, also with view to potential effects of 
global crises, and dependency issues more generally, initiated by a phasing-out over time of international 
funds. By this token, an additional advantage of a partial financing through donor countries lies in the 
program’s capacity to link transfers from North to South (international) to transfers from wealthy to poor in 
the South (national). This way, the program simultaneously addresses national and international inequality 
(Howard, 2007). Concerns by potential donor countries that funds going to developing countries will 
necessarily “fall into the hands of a corrupt bureaucracy, and thus will not address the needs of the poor” 
(Howard, 2007, p. 3) can simultaneously be dismantled, since “cash going directly to the recipients can 
entirely bypass the bureaucracy” (ibid).  
C. ENDOGENOUS SOURCES AND THE MULTIPLIER EFFECT 
Besides exogenous inputs, the program will free substantial funds from existing programs that become 
obsolete, and is expected to create significant endogenous growth as explained above. Taking into account 
private household consumption levels of 84% on a regional average, growth rates induced by additional 
disposable income are considerable and almost as high as initial investment. Albeit exact numbers should be 
handled with caution, due to their interdependence with numerous external factors, parts of the costs could 
be covered by capitalizing on program-generated growth. Over the five phases, autochthonous regional 
average growth is expected to exceed 7%, though large national differences prevail due to differences in 
investment34. 
                                                     
30 For the case of Central America, the upper/lower income deciles ratio is arguably larger than in most other regions, allowing 
for significantly lower necessary top tax rate, or higher BI. 
31 He holds that until the mid-1990s, income distributional changes where mostly determined by salary differences, while 
towards the end of the decade, the determining factor started to become private sector and entrepreneurial activities rents, 
which are held to be the decisive part of the explanation of inequality. 
32 For a more comprehensive list of possible additional (national) sources see Pereira 2010, p. 22-24. 
33 $1200 Million versus $1650 Million paid by the Mexican State. 





EXPECTED GDP GROWTH GENERATED BY A BASIC INCOME IN CENTRAL AMERICA 
Expected GDP 
growth (%) per 
country 
Phase One Phase Two Phase Three Phase Four Phase Five 
Costa Rica 0.6856 0.5149 0.1762 0.3388 0.9946 
El Salvador 1.9215 1.2444 0.4453 0.6222 1.8666 
Guatemala 3.3698 1.6484 0.3573 0.5846 2.1599 
Honduras 2.9293 1.6955 0.3423 0.6129 2.3800 
Nicaragua 4.7093 2.9211 0.6279 1.1193 4.2725 
Central America 2.6152 1.5790 0.4179 0.7062 2.3916 
Source: own construction 
D. REGIONAL FUND 
Another option for finance is the establishing of a regional fund. Senator Suplicy (2007) suggests for the 
case of Brazil the introduction of a fund similar to the one financing the Bolsa Familia program today, 
receiving 0.08% contribution on all financial transactions in Brazil35. It could thus be imagined to create a 
similar, regional fund for Central America, financed through a transaction, resource, or even income tax. 
Different options could be conceived of for the financing of this fund: it could be decided that everybody 
exceeding a certain income threshold will have to pay a percentage, allocated to the fund (much like 
Howard’s suggestion of taxation for the higher income strata in North America), or that each country 
contributes with an agreed amount of GDP to the fund. The money can thereafter be distributed according to 
cost burdens as % of GDP needs of the participating countries. This regional option could foster unification 
and a sense of commitment among the countries, while addressing intraregional inequality much more 
effectively. Through the imposition of regional control, moreover, capture by local politics can be avoided. 
On a different note, considering the urgency of environmental action in the region related to 
hazard and climate change, as well as the adverse impact large program-generated growth could have in 
the long run on the already devastated region, the proposal of an Energy Tax (Howard, 2007)36 should be 
further explored, applied these days by Iran in terms of financing its transfers through oil tax. One could, 
for instance, conceive of a resource (petrol, carbon) tax of reasonable size37 for the region. This 
suggestion could be applied grounded in a GPD-based contribution by each state (Van Parijs & 
Vanderborght, 2001, in Howard, 2007), and would have the advantage of encouraging energy efficiency. 
Despite this solution not being strictly “protective” of the environment, it nonetheless, in combination 
with (environmental) education, could mitigate impacts of hazardous production through responsible 
consumption, on the one hand, and disincentivize use of finite/non-renewable resources, on the other. 
Such a tax is most likely to be effective when applied on a regional level – as opposed to national – so as 
to discourage evasion through transnational transactions and prompt acceptation among the population. 
Also in terms of political reasons, a coupling of poverty reduction and environmental protection 
issues could be highly recommendable. Howard (2007) declares that a program of this kind must have 
great appeal and generate positive feedback, considering it “is affordable without excessive cost for the 
                                                     
35 Pereira 2010, p.15 ff. offers an overview over different countries’ funds and their input source. 
36 For details and calculations refer to Howard 2007, p.20. 
37 Were energy taxes really high, they would fall disproportionately on the lower deciles of the population, thus counteracting 




better-off and promises, in combination with other policies, to ease migration pressures [and] links 
reduction of energy consumption with economic justice and demographic stability” (Howard, 2007, p. 3). 
Summing up, this proposal, following Künnemann (2004), suggests an initial combination of 
autochthonous, tax-based finance, and international contributions. For the region, two different yet not 
mutually exclusive, general directions could be imagined, national and regional finance, respectively. 
Contributions could be collected based on some form, or a combination of income, energy, wealth, and 
corporate profits taxes (Howard, 2007). 
Manifestly, in terms of cost and financing, the substantial cost of not-implementation needs to be 
considered: current status imposes large financial burdens on the state and hence a small part of the 
population in the formal sector paying taxes, while social costs in terms of poverty and lack of options, 
and opportunity costs related to persistently low productivity and competitiveness, circumvent the 




VIII. INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 
Thanks to new and ever-improving technology, administration and distribution of transfers could proceed 
over a centralized banking system directly, or alternatively be organized through municipality distribution. 
Considering registration, the incentives for parents to register their newborns are quite obvious. For listing 
of the existing population, most straightforward, yet with significant systemic risks, is the optional 
procedure of “everybody who registers receives” Iran plans to implement for its hardly approved, brand-
new version of a national BI (BIEN 2010b). Under such a system of voluntary registration, however, 
asymmetric information problems, especially in rural areas, have to be taken into account and compensated 
for by special mobilization.  
Registration of the population for the program is not a minor issue. One can conceive of 
numerous incentives for fraud confronted with the situation of having to register for cash transfers. 
Biometric information like fingerprints in combination with birth certificates or other identification can be 
used to ensure beneficiaries only receive “their” transfer, like successfully practiced in Namibia: Having 
one of the most advanced yet simple and efficient systems of paying cash grants, Namibia uses an 
electronic card with fingerprint identification of claimants. Each month vans with mobile cash-dispensing 
machines and computers38 drive out to the payment spots all over the country, and the recipients present 
their cards and receive the cash grant (Haarmann & Haarmann, 2007). Standing (2008, p.25) explains 
how the authorities counter the possibility of fraudulent claims made on behalf of dead people: “[they] 
ingeniously introduced a burial insurance scheme within the pension; the pensioner, on registering to 
receive the pension, takes out a mandatory life insurance, whereby funeral costs are covered when he or 
she dies; application for the burial funds enables the authorities to cancel the card at the same time. Given 
the symbolic significance of decent burials and their cost, the insurance scheme has been found to be very 
successful in all respects”. 
Finally, to allow citizens to institutionally claim their right to a BI, it needs to be constitutionally 
secured, like it is in Mexico City for the elderly, in Brazil and Iran now, and equipped with the legal 
instruments necessary for citizens to be assured of its enforcement. This can be ascertained only if 
political authority for the program is not concentrated in the hands of a few individuals. 
                                                     
38 Take-up rate for the grant is close to 90 percent – remarkably high by comparison with all other pension schemes in 
developing countries, and higher than any means-tested scheme operating anywhere. Costs are equivalent to about 30 US 
cents per person per month, also remarkably low by comparison with other systems. The Namibian scheme is administered 





The study outlined here describes the possibility to eradicate extreme poverty in the region of Central 
America through the implementation of a universal, unconditional cash transfer to all citizens. Such a 
scheme would establish a paradigm change in development policy thinking in so far as it moves away from 
conditionality and means-testing on the one hand, and charity and “altruism” on the other, towards a rights-
based, “preventive” approach. As such, it marks a strategic turn in socio-economic development for the 
region (Huerta, 2009). 
The estimations of the study presented defeat the claim that in the developing countries in general 
no universal system of social protection is financially feasible (Standing, 2007). It has been shown that 
through a combination of input sources from both national/regional and international resources, as well as 
program generated growth and a more efficient tax regime, the costs calculated to be relatively modest 
compared to their reach, could be covered. This holds especially considering that the problem of the 
region is not its lack of resources, but rather their distribution (Yanes, 2008). 
Depending on political willingness, other – maybe more ambitious – regimes could be imaginable 
and feasible. Thus, this study is a starting point for further elaboration, and can be expanded over its 
conceptual trajectory from a regional extreme poverty eradication program towards (eventually) a 
dignified income on a level comfortable enough to guarantee a reasonable and ethical living standard for 
everybody throughout the region (or beyond). Simultaneously, costs can over time be internalized, so as 
to decrease dependency on foreign donors and guarantee sustainability. Ensuring economic sustainability, 
however, does not safeguard environmental thresholds. Rather, the ecologic impact of sustained economic 
growth is likely to stress natural equilibrium. Since poverty is closely linked to environmental problems, 
an integral solution is forwarded in this context, promoting the implementation of an environmental 
tribute like a petrol, carbon or similar tax, collected in a regional fund to be paid out in transfers directly 
to the people. 
Self-evidently, a BI is a policy, not a universal panacea, and needs to be embedded into a 
framework of other policies and broader politics. There is, therefore, in view of the immense difficulty 
attainment of a political coalition on the regional plane promises to become, the need for daring yet 
responsible politics in the region. In the end, Van der Veen & Van Parijs (2006) hold that political 
feasibility depends to a large degree on what can be shown to make economic and ethical sense. A 
regional BI makes economic and social sense. It could be the starting point of a profound, constructive 
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